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One Hat Too Many?: 
Problems & Proposals regarding  
Investment Desegregation in Private Equity 
 
“We’ve adopted a policy not to wear more hats than you 
have heads. And we think wearing an equity hat and a debt 
hat is one hat too many.”1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
When private equity shop Apollo Management recently purchased 
the distressed debt of one of its portfolio companies, Linens ’n Things, 
business commentators wondered what was afoot. Was Apollo’s legendary 
chief, Leon Black, throwing good money after bad in an attempt to cut his 
losses?  Or, instead, did he know something the bondholders did not? 
These queries – like so many academic explorations into private equity 
and other collective investment vehicles — focus upon the role of funds as 
investors. Is Linens ’n Things more likely to succeed under private or 
public ownership and why? Are leveraged buyouts an efficient realignment 
of interests or simply a wealth transfer with high transaction costs? What 
can private equity investments tell us about corporate governance in 
general? These are interesting questions, to be sure, and ones other 
authors in this volume will no doubt explore, but they leave unaddressed 
important issues about the very structure and management of private 
investment funds themselves. These fund formation topics and, 
specifically, hidden conflicts in the industry’s structure and operation 
amid today’s new world of private investing are the focus of our essay.2 
Whatever the reason Apollo may have purchased the distressed 
debt of Linens ’n Things, the consequence of their decision is that Apollo 
(acting through its investment managers) now oversees two separate funds 
with investments in different and conflicting segments of the capital 
structure of one of its portfolio companies.  This dual position raises 
significant legal questions, since Apollo owes fiduciary duties to investors 
in both funds.3 The time may come, as the Apollo situation seems to 
                                                
1 Wilbur L. Ross, quoted by Heidi N. Moore, Mood Subdued at Super Return, WALL ST. J., 
June 4, 2008, at C4. 
2 Private equity managers are typically compensated using a “2 & 20” scheme, in which 
the general partner of a fund receives a 2% management fee and a 20% stake in the fund’s 
profits.  Most academic papers focus on issues concerning the “20” while this paper is 
about those that concern the “2”; that is, we explore questions relating to fund structure 
and formation rather than acquisitions. Our emphasis is the other side of the coin from 
the important work done by Black & Hu on the conflicts in the investment operations of 
hedge funds and similar private investments. 
3 As discussed below, partners in a private equity fund may be able to reduce or eliminate 
these duties in some circumstances through waiver or choice of law.  The law is unclear as 
to the exact parameters under which this diminishment of fiduciary duties can be 
accomplished, if at all.  The prospect of eliminating fiduciary and similar duties entirely, 
however, is very unlikely.  For a discussion of this issue, and why fiduciary duties may get 
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herald, when the general partner must choose between favoring its debt 
investment or its equity investment; at that moment, conflicts of interest 
will be unavoidable and may force the general partner into an untenable 
position.4 
Apollo’s distressed debt investment subsequent to its earlier (failed) 
equity investment—an investment pattern known in the industry as “loan 
to re-own”—is not an isolated sequence. This phenomenon is growing as 
many companies acquired recently via leveraged buyouts begin to fall on 
hard times and (according to lawyers and bankers familiar with many of 
these deals) to attract debt investments from the very investment firms 
that imposed the leverage upon them in the first place. This trend is likely 
to continue. According to Standard & Poor’s, as of March 2007, over 90 
U.S. firms were teetering on the edge of bankruptcy,5 and over half of these 
had been involved in LBOs during the recent credit boom. Buyout firms 
involved in these deals are eagerly evaluating loan t0 re-own investments, 
but their advisors, several of whom we interviewed for this project, voice 
concern about the legal implications of such investments. Like the 
fiduciary conflicts inherent in down-round investments made by venture 
capitalists in struggling start-up companies,6 these private equity loan to 
re-own deals are plagued by potential fiduciary pitfalls. We show in this 
essay that inefficient regulations likely exacerbate these problems by 
forcing fund managers into suboptimal fund design. 
The potential inter-fund (and intra-fund manager) conflict 
embedded in a loan to re-own transaction is just one example of a broader 
and growing phenomenon in private investing. There was a day, not so 
long ago, when investment managers practiced a form of strategic 
segregation: venture capitalists focused upon early-stage investments in 
start-ups with an eye toward exiting through an initial public offering; 
private equity investors took controlling equity positions in established 
companies with the intention of improving profitability; and vulture 
investors bought the debt of distressed companies in the hope of 
controlling the firm’s reorganization. Private equity funds didn’t act like 
VCs or vultures, nor vice versa. One underappreciated benefit of this 
former segregation was that fund managers had a simple objective: 
maximize the value of the particular slice of the capital structure in which 
the fund’s investors were investing. In legal parlance, the fund manager (a 
“general partner” in nearly all cases) owed a fiduciary duty to fund 
                                                                                                                                
in the way of efficient contracting, see Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other 
People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309 (2008). 
4 We are not privy to the details of the Apollo transactions, so we use this example for 
illustrative purposes only.   
5 This status means a credit rating of B- or lower.  The three-year default rate for firms 
with this rating is 43%, compared with 28% for firms rated above B-.  See Shanny Basar, 
Apollo Acts to Protect its Stake in Linens Holding, May 13, 2008, available at 
http://www.financialnews-
us.com/index.cfm?page=ushome&contentid=2450621125&uid=7508-8505-461313-
414214 
6 See Baird & Henderson, supra note [3].  See also text accompanying notes [x-y] infra. 
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investors (almost always “limited partners”), which meant that the general 
partner was legally obliged to focus entirely and without conflict on 
maximizing the value of these specific investments. 
But this narrow focus is quickly expanding and, as it does so, 
beginning to blur. Changes in the fortunes of the buyout market and, more 
generally, credit markets have prompted fund managers to diversify their 
investment strategies. Private equity fund managers have begun to expand 
their investment strategies from the typical and routine LBO to include 
investments in debt and more exotic financial instruments, such as 
options, credit instruments, and other derivatives. The Blackstone Group, 
Apollo Management, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., The Carlyle Group, 
and other buyout firms have recently launched new funds that specialize in 
such alternative investment strategies. These new investments 
undoubtedly make financial sense for the fund managers, as they likely 
expand the manager’s expected profits while their diversification of 
strategies simultaneously reduces the managers’ risk. Desegregation, 
however, is not without significant pitfalls to investors in those managers’ 
funds.  
At the same time, other investors, such as hedge funds, traditional 
investment and commercial banks, and even stodgy old insurance 
companies are also diversifying their investment strategies.7 Investment 
bank Goldman Sachs now has numerous private equity funds and hedge 
funds under its management, as well as countless other esoteric 
investment vehicles. Goldman is certainly not alone. Nearly every large 
financial institution in the U.S. financial markets, from Bank of America to 
Bain Capital and investment houses in between, practices a broadening 
swath of the spectrum of private investing. In the Apollo deal described 
above, Apollo’s two co-investors in the original equity buyout were hedge 
fund Silver Point Capital and the private investing arm of realty firm 
National Retail & Development Capital. In short, the lines between 
different types of private investing are smudging or even disappearing 
altogether, which, as we describe, raises a new set of serious issues for 
these funds and their investors. 
In this essay, we identify and discuss the potential problems 
inherent in this desegregation and offer preliminary thoughts on how they 
and other similar conflicts may be ameliorated. We also examine the 
normative question whether this development is truly a problem from a 
social welfare perspective. We argue that diversification may in fact be 
optimal, and the difficulties lie not so much in the potential conflicts but in 
regulations that exacerbate such conflicts by forcing the conflicts 
underground in ways that make them less likely to be observed and priced 
by the market.  
Part I briefly outlines the typical issues involved in private equity 
fund formation, focusing upon the attractions and limitations of the 
                                                
7 See, e.g., Prince Wall Street, Why the Private Equity Investment Style Drift?, SEEKING 
ALPHA, Apr. 10, 2008, available at http://seekingalpha.com/article/71776-why-the-
private-equity-investment-style-drift. 
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industry’s penchant for the limited partnership structure. Part II identifies 
specific conflicts of interest created by the blurring of private investment 
strategies using several real-world examples from the recent downturn in 
the credit markets. 
Part III suggests several approaches to mitigate the costs of 
conflicting investments by general partners. The most interesting of these 
suggestions involves expanding the nascent secondary market on which 
private equity interests are traded. We offer the first academic description 
of this market and describe the impact that liquid secondary markets 
might have on ameliorating conflicts of interest. The intuition here is novel 
but straightforward: easy exit reduces risks for investors in particular parts 
of the capital structure and therefore imposes discipline upon fund 
managers.  
Finally, we turn to normative questions about the desirability and 
efficiency of conflicting investment positions. We argue that is it far from 
clear that these investments are bad for society, and present several 
reasons why attempts to limit investment strategies, either by regulation 
or litigation, may be self-defeating. Market and contractual solutions are 
likely to be far superior, although the law may have some work to do to 
create conditions that encourage free contracting on these issues. 
  
I.  FUND FORMATION IN THE PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY 
 
Private equity investment typically begins with a group of 
individuals deciding to offer their labor (and often their money) as asset 
managers through an investment advisory entity that will raise funds, 
identify investment opportunities, and subsequently oversee equity 
investments in target firms. The investment adviser, however, does not do 
the investing and managing of the target firms directly, but rather creates 
subsidiaries, which are the private equity funds, to hold investors’ interests 
in portfolio companies. 
Funds are almost always established as limited partnerships. The 
private equity investment adviser – or one of its subsidiaries – acts as 
general partner to these limited partnerships and makes all decisions on 
investment in and operation of portfolio companies.8 
Investors in private equity funds are limited partners; they 
contribute only money, not management. These limited partners are 
almost always large institutional investors, such as university 
endowments, public pension funds, and other substantial pools of money; 
wealthy individuals rarely, if ever, invest as limited partners in private 
equity funds.  
 
                                                
8 In some deals, the general partner will operate with co-venturers in the form of other 
investment funds.  These “partners” in the deal add another level of complexity.  In 
addition, some “public” investors are actually intermediaries, like pension funds or 
sovereign wealth funds.  This structure therefore implicates multiple levels of potential 
agency costs. 
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A. Attractions of the Limited Partnership Structure 
 
Private equity firms typically form funds using the limited 
partnership business form because of its favorable tax characteristics, as 
well as its combination of contractual flexibility and legal default settings 
with respect to fiduciary duties.  The limited partnership, unlike the 
corporate form, offers favorable pass-through tax treatment for investors.9  
The limited partnership form also provides freedom to the general 
and limited partners to contract over details about how the partnership 
will be organized and managed. Each limited partner invests pursuant to a 
detailed limited partnership agreement (LPA) negotiated by the general 
partner and the investors.  
In addition to providing the parties with transactional flexibility, 
LPAs also serve to align the interests of general and limited partners by 
setting forth their rights and responsibilities. The agreements set forth the 
amount of the investor’s capital commitment, the expected use of 
proceeds, the likely timing of capital calls (against the commitment),10 the 
fund’s investment horizon, and perhaps most importantly the general 
partner’s compensation scheme.  
The fiduciary duties that a general partner owes its limited partners 
are also important tools in aligning the interests of advisers and investors, 
and they are determined both as a function both of state law and 
contractual terms negotiated in the LPA.11 In any particular jurisdiction, 
state law typically sets forth the fiduciary duties of partners, generally, and 
of general partners in a limited partnership, more specifically.12 For the 
purposes of the U.S. private equity industry, the most relevant 
jurisdictions are Delaware on the one hand and states that rely upon 
uniform partnership acts on the other. Delaware statutes,13 by and large, 
permit a broad degree of flexibility, granting parties wide latitude in 
customizing fiduciary duties to their particular needs, rather than 
imposing a rigid mandate upon all parties regardless of sophistication.14 
                                                
9 Subchapter S corporations and limited liability companies are impractical and 
disfavored by the industry. 
10 An investor committing $100 million to a private equity fund, for instance, typically 
will agree to invest this sum over a period of time while the general partner makes 
investments in portfolio companies.  In practice, then, the general partner might call for 
$10 million from each limited partner to make the first acquisition, and then 
subsequently call for another $10 million, and so forth.  Limited Partnership Agreements 
also routinely provide for rights or obligations regarding future investments in other 
funds.  
11 See generally Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983). 
12 See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership 
Agreements, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 927 (2004). 
13 Specifically, the Delaware Limited Partnership Act.  See Del. Code, title 6, § 17-1101(d)-
(f) (2004). 
14 See generally Kenneth M. Jacobson, Fiduciary Duty Considerations in Choosing 
between Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, American Bar 
Association, Spring 2001, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3714/is_200104/ai_n8942283 
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The classic set of duties that a general partner owes to its limited 
partners includes a duty of loyalty, a duty of care, and a related obligation 
of good faith and fair dealing.15 Under these broad rubrics fall more 
specific requirements: for instance, the duty of loyalty may subsume more 
specific duties to account to the partnership for property or profit, to 
refrain from dealing in an adverse manner to the partnership, and to avoid 
competing with the partnership.16 Similarly, the duty of care may 
encompass a duty to refrain “from engaging in grossly negligent or 
reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.”17 
Once private equity players determine the universe of possible 
fiduciary duties in their given jurisdiction, their next task is to determine 
the degree to which those duties are mandatory or merely defaults; that is, 
the extent to which the general and limited partners forming a private 
equity fund may vary background duties via their contract, the LPA. 
Uniform partnership acts do not expressly address the question whether 
partners may waive, limit, or restrict fiduciary duties18; thus, in the states 
governed by those statutes, courts have typically been called upon to 
evaluate the validity of any attempts to modify baseline duties, such as by 
adjudicating whether or not specific activities are “manifestly 
unreasonable” abridgements of a particular duty. 
The Delaware limited partnership statute, in contrast to those of 
these other jurisdictions, is explicitly permissive, expressly adopting “the 
principle of freedom of contact” and allowing partners to specify their 
fiduciary duties.19  Professor Larry Ribstein provides thorough and 
illuminating guidance on the judicial and legislative aspects of this issue, 
and cites the deference Delaware courts afford to the parties’ attempts to 
contract around fiduciary duties. Ribstein quotes Chancellor Strine, who 
opines that Delaware courts 
 
will not be tempted by the piteous pleas of limited 
partners who are seeking to escape the consequences 
of their own decisions to become investors in a 
partnership whose general partner has clearly 
exempted itself from traditional fiduciary duties. The 
[Act] puts investors on notice that fiduciary duties 
may be altered by partnership agreements, and 
therefore that investors should be careful to read 
partnership agreements before buying units.20 
                                                
15 See Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1997) § 103(b). 
16 See Jacobson, supra note [15] (citing comments to § 404 of the Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act). 
17 Id. 
18 See Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 537, 571-577 (1997). 
19 Del. Code, title 6, § 17-1101(c) (2004). 
20 Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 213 – 214 (2004) 
(quoting Miller v. Am. Real Estate Partners, No. Civ.A. 16788, 2001 WL 1045643 (Del. 
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Moreover, in 2004, the Delaware act was even more unequivocally 
liberalized to permit the entire elimination of all fiduciary duties other 
than the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.21 Since that date, 
however, no major judicial decisions have interpreted the new statutory 
language, and legal advisors to private equity managers express 
reservations about sweeping contractual attempts to waive common law 
notions of fiduciary duty in these partnerships. 
Thus, although certain fiduciary duties may be waived in the limited 
partnership agreements of private equity funds – particularly Delaware 
limited partnerships – such waivers are still considered somewhat 
speculative and risky by general partners and almost certainly would not 
apply to opportunistic behavior or other actions that constitute bad faith 
or unfair dealing. Although private equity parties may contractually 
specify the duties that govern their relationship, absolute waivers of the 
duty of loyalty will be construed narrowly and will turn on the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the waiver.22 It is therefore not surprising that 
notwithstanding Strine’s rather blunt characterization, lawyers familiar 
with these deals, even ones in Delaware, are skeptical that Delaware’s 
laissez faire approach will insulate waivers of fiduciary duties from judicial 
review, especially in the type of conflicted investments we discuss in this 
essay. 
 
B. Limitations of the Limited Partnership Structure 
 
What distinguishes private equity from other forms of investment 
in private firms is the lock-in of capital in the fund for a long period of 
time. Investors cannot simply withdraw their money whenever they 
please, regardless of whether they may need it for another purpose (such 
as paying pensions) or because the investment is no longer earning 
acceptable rates of return. An investment in managing newly private 
companies with large debt burdens is, by its very nature, a long-term 
proposition, and investors in buyouts need the fortitude and financial 
resources for a long haul. Private equity funds share this lock-in 
characteristic with venture capital funds, as distinguished from hedge 
funds, mutual funds, bank deposits, and broker accounts, all of which are 
usually redeemable with shorter notice or even upon demand.  
This lock-in feature generates agency costs between the general 
partner and limited partners. Limited partners have neither voice (since 
this would make them not “limited”) nor exit (since there is but a meager 
                                                                                                                                
Ch. Sept. 6, 2001)); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in 
Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 571-577 (1997 
21 The Delaware limited partnership statute provides that “duties may be expanded or 
restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership agreement.” See Delaware Code, 
title 6, § 17-1101(d)-(f), as amended by SB 273, signed May 4, 2004. 
22 For examples of circumstances in which a waiver may be suspect, see supra _.  
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secondary market for interests), one or both of which is considered 
essential for imposing discipline upon managers. Some limited partners 
can reduce managerial slack or self-interest through side letters, by 
negotiating for access to greater information (though not management) or 
preferred exit rights. Below, we propose a potential solution: the creation 
of a robust secondary market in private equity investments, which would 
allow for accurate pricing of investments, and therefore a marginally 
greater incentive for managers to act in the best interest of investors. But 
this nascent market may yet be years away from providing sufficient 
liquidity to mitigate agency costs significantly in this environment.  
The lock-in problem is exacerbated by the kinds of conflicts of 
interest that we describe in this article. Historically, agency costs in private 
equity were quite low, notwithstanding lock in of capital. The lack of exit 
and voice did not create serious problems because the high-powered 
incentives of general partners—the two-and-twenty scheme described 
above—generally aligned the interests of managers and investors. This 
alignment begins to diverge, however, when general partners acquire 
investments of different types in different parts of the capital structure or 
along different time horizons. We now turn to these potential conflicts. 
 
II. THE NEW CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
 
The Apollo transaction is not the only exemplar of the new 
phenomenon of heightened conflicts in a desegregated financial world. 
Another recent instance involved TPG Capital and Goldman Sachs and 
their investment in Alltel Corporation. In May of 2007, TPG and Goldman 
each invested $1.6 billion in an LBO with four banks – Goldman, Citigroup 
Inc., Barclays PLC, and Royal Bank of Scotland Group – underwriting 
$21.5 billion of debt.23 When the credit markets froze, the banks absorbed 
most of those loans on their own balance sheets; one year later, when the 
credit markets began to thaw, the banks began selling their debt at a 
discount. Indeed, one of the buyers in those Alltell debt sales was TPG (the 
issuer of the debt in the first place), which purchased some of the loans 
from Citigroup for 90 cents on the dollar in April of 2008. Then, just two 
months later in June of 2008, the private equity consortium sold Alltel to 
Verizon for $28.1 billion, generating a 28 percent return for the original 
private equity investors. In addition, TPG also profited from a rise in the 
value of the Alltel debt that it acquired.24 Thus, in just over a year, TPG 
executed investments in Alltel in two tranches of the investment spectrum 
– private equity and public debt – and profited from both. 
Although this diversification may make perfect economic sense for 
                                                
23 See Serena Ng & Peter Lattman, Alltel Deal Yields a Big Profit, WALL ST. J., June 6, 
2008, at C1.  Co-investors contributed the balance of the purchase price to the original 
LBO.  See id. 
24 See id. 
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investors—it clearly did in the Alltel deal25—and may benefit managers, it 
nevertheless raises potential conflicts of interest that, if not addressed 
properly, may result in untenable legal positions for investment managers. 
As we show, these conflicts may be exacerbated by existing legal rules and 
regulations, which may have the impact of driving potentially efficient 
transactions into suboptimal structures that create the potential for abuse 
by investment managers at the expense of their investors. 
In this section, we consider the various types of conflict of interest 
likely to arise as a result of desegregation, using illustrations from the 
recent downturn in the private equity markets. The past five years have 
seen an unprecedented boom in the number and size of private equity 
buyouts. From 2001 to 2007, investors conducted hundreds of buyouts, 
and total assets under the management of private equity funds doubled to 
over $700 billion.26 In 2007, however, the buyout wave crested and began 
to cool as a crunch in the credit markets drove up the costs of financing 
debt-laden acquisitions. 
Buyers in transactions that were signed but not closed attempted to 
walk away, generating numerous lawsuits. Completed acquisitions, like 
Linens ’n Things, also struggled as broadly challenging macroeconomic 
conditions undermined some of the financial rationale underlying certain 
acquisitions. Several recent buyouts have headed toward bankruptcy and, 
as a result, the bonds that financed these acquisitions have traded at large 
discounts to par value. According to Fortune magazine, 43 percent of 
LBOs transacted in the past four years were distressed as of the Spring of 
2008.27 These soured deals create opportunities for down-round 
investments and, as we explore next, potential opportunism. 
 
A. Advisers v. Investors: the Down-Round Problem 
 
Private investments regularly involve multiple rounds of financing. 
Conducting investments in orderly stages permits the contracting parties 
to reduce information asymmetries, to resolve market uncertainties, and 
to ascertain and better manage risks. Unsurprisingly, therefore, highly 
risky investments are typically made incrementally and in increasing 
                                                
25 TPG’s investment reeks of insider trading, since it likely knew about the upcoming 
Verizon deal when it purchased Alltel debt at a discount from the banks, who likely did 
not know about the deal. If TPG bought Alltel stock based on this private information, the 
transaction would be illegal. But being debt and being between two large, sophisticated 
financial entities, the rules are different. TPG and the banks likely executed Big Boy 
letters waiving any reliance and accepting that one or the other might have private 
information. See M. Todd Henderson, Deconstructing Duff & Phelps, ___ U. CHI. L. REV. 
__ (2007) (discussing “Big Boy” letters). 
26 See Diana Farrell, “Private Equity Isn’t Fading Away,” BUS. WEEK, Nov. 20, 2007, 
http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/mginews/private_equity.asp.  
27 See Allan Sloan & Katie Benner, “The year of the vulture: The private equity firms that 
will thrive in the year ahead are those that know how to profit from others' misfortunes,” 
FORTUNE, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/05/12/news/companies/year_of_the_vulture_sloan.fortu
ne/index.htm?postversion=2008051412.  
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amounts as the investment in question matures, a phenomenon 
particularly well demonstrated by the venture capital industry.   
Venture funds invest not only when the passage of time reveals 
good news but also when it reveals bad. This latter stage is known as the 
“down round,” as in a round of investing when fortunes for the target have 
declined. In the prototypical case, a venture capital fund that has taken a 
large equity stake in the portfolio firm (usually in the form of convertible 
preferred stock) agrees to lend the firm additional money to stay afloat 
(usually in the form of an emergency loan that is convertible into equity) 
until the firm can secure additional financing or conduct an initial public 
offering. This down-round investing generates serious conflicts of interest 
for the venture capital investors because the fund stands on both sides of 
the transaction: representatives of the venture capital fund typically both 
sit on the board of directors of the start up and negotiate against the 
interests of the firm as a lender of last resort. These conflicts are well 
known in the venture capital industry, and lawyers to participants in these 
scenarios counsel extreme caution in the event of down-round investments 
by funds that have previously invested in earlier stages of financing.28 
Private equity investments historically consisted of only one round 
of financing: an initial equity investment conducted via an LBO. Multiple 
rounds do not generally make sense in private equity, since an LBO is a 
comprehensive event in which a discrete equity investment is tied to a 
restructuring of the target firm’s entire balance sheet. Multiple rounds 
may also be less necessary since the target businesses in question are well-
established with mature cash flows and are subjected to extensive due 
diligence.  
Recently, though, the declining market has brought down-round 
financing to the world of private equity. General partners are now 
launching funds specifically designed to acquire down-market discounted 
debt, especially those of portfolio companies that the same general 
partners initially took private. Recent media reports allude to, but have 
few details of, down-round private equity investments made by Apollo and 
TPG (in Harrah’s Entertainment debt) and by KKR and TPG (in TXU 
debt).29 
That these follow-on investments are viewed as profit-making 
opportunities by general partners should not come as a surprise. Most 
obviously, the general partner is often attempting to cut its losses and to 
retain control of the portfolio company. Such a move may boost the 
general partner’s overall performance statistics and help mitigate any 
reputational losses that might arise from a “failed” buyout. As noted in the 
Alltel deal above, such investments can also be nearly a sure thing – a fund 
                                                
28 See, for example, Matthew P. Quilter et al., Duties of Directors: Venture Capitalist 
Board Representatives and Conflicts of Interest, 131 PLI/Corp. 1101, 1103-04 (2002). 
29 See Allan Sloan & Katie Benner, “The year of the vulture,” FORTUNE , PRIVATE MONEY 
2008, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/05/12/news/companies/year_of_the_vulture_sloan.fortu
ne/index.htm.  
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with private information about the value of debt held by another may be 
able to capitalize upon that information without liability. 
Thus, one way to think about desegregation is as deal insurance. 
Buyouts are very risk ventures, and a general partner that operates both an 
equity fund and a debt fund that invest in the same portfolio companies 
may be able to reduce the overall risk of buyouts. Consider an equity 
investment of $100 in a portfolio company that expects to return 50 
percent in five years but has a 5 percent chance of declaring bankruptcy, in 
which case the value of the investment will be zero. The general partner 
also has a $100 commitment from the equity investors to invest in the debt 
of the portfolio company in the event of distress. The general partner will 
be uniquely positioned to indentify profit-making opportunities in the 
portfolio company’s debt, since it knows the company – and can therefore 
determine the true value of the company’s debt – better than anyone else. 
The general partner’s equity investors would thus simply be hedging the 5 
percent risk of default by participating in profits that can be made in the 
event of default. If the investment in distressed bonds expects a similar 50 
percent return with 95% probability, and a return of -10% otherwise, the 
combined investment in equity and debt earns a return of 45% instead of 
the 43% from the equity investment only.  
Notwithstanding these calculations, limited partners in private 
equity funds may not be as bullish about these investments as are the 
general partners. First and foremost, these investors can self-insure, 
perhaps at much lower cost, through their own diversification strategy. 
This discrepancy is especially acute because down-round investments 
create significant potential conflicts of interest between the general 
partner and its investors. The general partner has a fiduciary obligation to 
maximize the return for all of its investors, a duty that may not be 
attainable if the general partner holds different positions in a failing firm’s 
capital structure in different private equity funds comprising different 
limited partners.30 If a portfolio company becomes distressed, or most 
obviously goes bankrupt, one set of limited partners will inevitably lose at 
the expense of others.31 Investors have plenty of alternative investment 
options free from these conflicts. 
 
B. Advisers v. Investors v. Shareholders 
 
Potential conflicts may also arise between the investors in various 
funds and the duties owed to a publicly traded general partner’s own 
                                                
30 This is just another example of the “two hats” phenomenon in bankruptcy.  
31 This down-round problem is not unique to private equity. Venture capitalist investors 
face significant conflicts in the investments they make in start-up firms, since they often 
sit on the board of these firms and are often in the best position to loan the start up 
money in the event it falls on hard times. These down-round investments can be seriously 
dilutive to the other (common) shareholders, and herein lies the potential for conflict. 
See, for example, Matthew P. Quilter et al., Duties of Directors: Venture Capitalist Board 
Representatives and Conflicts of Interest, 131 PLI/Corp. 1101, 1103-04 (2002). 
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shareholders. Several large private equity firms are now publicly traded on 
stock exchanges, thus forcing investment managers to choose amongst 
three sets of investors: equity fund investors, debt fund investors, and 
shareholders in the general partner. The general manager’s shareholders 
will trump any individual set of limited partners’ interests. This preference 
may exist for a variety reasons. First, managers, who are compensated in 
part in stock, will be more responsive to equity prices than the views of 
limited partners with respect to follow-on investments. Second, the threat 
of litigation from public shareholders is more likely because of the saliency 
of potential breaches, the greater incentives of plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring 
these cases, and the stricter fiduciary duties that likely apply to public 
shareholders compared with limited partners.  
 
C. Advisers v. Advisers 
 
One more set of conflicts is worth mentioning briefly. In many 
recent private equity deals, funds have formed consortia with other private 
investment funds, such as hedge funds and real estate investment trusts. 
These outside investors may have different investment horizons and 
objectives, which in turn may exacerbate potential down-round conflicts.  
To see the untenable position that fund managers may find 
themselves in, consider the following simple case. A publicly traded 
general manager creates a fund (Fund A) to invest in the LBO of Acme Inc. 
This LBO investment will be conducted jointly in a consortium with two 
hedge funds. When the fortunes of Acme deteriorate, the general manager 
of Fund A creates a second fund (Fund B) to invest in Acme’s debt. One of 
the hedge funds agrees to join the second fund, as do half of the original 
investors in Fund A. When making decisions about the fortunes of Acme, 
as it must inevitably do, the general manager now finds itself in the 
position of having to consider the interests of maximizing the return to its 
own public shareholders, complying with the limited partnership 
agreements in both Fund A and Fund B (as well as any fiduciary duty 
overlays), and the contractual obligations it owes to its joint venture 
partners. Satisfying all parties is theoretically possible but highly unlikely, 
particularly given that the conflict of interest between Fund A and Fund B 
alone may be substantial, such that the general partner will have to favor 
one over the other in the event of a bankruptcy or reorganization of Acme. 
 
III. PROPOSALS FOR AMELIORATING THE NEW CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
 
 These conflicts of interest are not just theoretical but are in practice 
causing significant uncertainty among deal planners, funds, investors, and 
other participants in the industry. Corporate lawyers, tax attorneys, and 
other fund advisors with whom we have spoken describe an atmosphere of 
fiduciary fear in a business that is rapidly expanding beyond its historical 
contours. The increasing diversification of investment products offered by 
a single investment adviser combined with the unpredictable inversions of 
14  /  Birdthistle & Henderson 
a distressed market is stretching the ability of advisers to maintain clear 
and uncomplicated fiduciary relationships with their investors.32  
We suggest an array of possible mechanisms to mitigate conflicts, 
and describe their operation, benefits, and costs. Some of these options are 
available today, while others may require years of additional evolution. 
Ultimately, we expect the private equity market to move towards a stable 
equilibrium in which these conflicts are well understood and effectively 
priced by the market. Here we hope to present modest suggestions for 
helping the industry’s participants to reach that equilibrium. 
 
A. Obtaining Unanimity amongst Investors 
 
The most obvious solution to inter-fund conflicts is to ensure that 
the investors in the funds are identical. If the identity and ownership 
interests of all relevant funds are identical, and participation of investors is 
voluntary and conducted with full disclosure of all possible conflicts, then 
this problem largely disappears,33 and what might at first seem to be a 
conflict-laden situation is actually quite efficient.  
 
1. Practical Challenges to Investor Unanimity 
 
Several limits may stymie private equity investors from obtaining 
the unanimity of ownership and consent across funds necessary to 
ameliorate the potential conflicts described in a down-round investment. 
First, some of the original equity fund investors may choose not to make a 
down-round investment for purely economic reasons. Although the 
investment may be sensible from the standpoint of the general partner, 
investors may have reason to doubt the wisdom of this diversification 
strategy. Investors can diversify themselves, and perhaps at much lower 
cost. This option is especially attractive since investment vehicles such as 
vulture funds specialize in investing in the debt of distressed firms. Such 
funds are likely to enjoy a competitive advantage over private equity 
investors, who have heretofore specialized only in equity investments in 
recapitalized businesses, not distressed debt. Private equity managers add 
value by identifying LBO targets and managing businesses with high debt 
burdens; they do not specialize in workouts or restructurings, which is 
what would be involved by investing in debt. The private equity firm may 
have private information that trumps its lack of expertise in debt 
                                                
32 This is not just a problem of complying with fiduciary duties. As noted above, fiduciary 
duties may be waivable under certain circumstances, and, more surely, general partners 
and investors have many choices of governing laws—ranging from Delaware to the 
Cayman Islands—and presumably some of these will have more permissive legal regimes 
regarding fiduciary duties. Nevertheless, investors may find themselves disadvantaged in 
conflict situations. This might not result in a lawsuit from the jilted investors, if the law 
and waiver are clear, but it does create potential inefficiencies. 
33 Although investing is generally presumed to be voluntary, a commitment made ex ante 
without full disclosure of potential conflicts may nevertheless be bailed out by courts on 
the grounds the investment was made on fraudulent or insufficient terms. 
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transactions, but this advantage may not always or especially be present. If 
investors can diversify in other less costly ways, as is surely possible, then 
the debt investment by a private equity fund may simply arise as an 
unwelcome product of agency costs, since the fund managers might prefer 
the investment for their own, selfish reasons. 
Second, some investors may face capital constraints that limit their 
ability to double down on a particular investment. As noted above, private 
equity investments are very large (averaging up to $100 million), and 
some investors may not have sufficient cash on hand to invest in 
additional funds at a given time. One solution to this problem would be to 
reduce the commitment amount for a given investor to a point where a 
down-round investment is possible. Thus, if a general partner creates two 
funds of $1 billion each, an investor who committed $100 million to the 
equity fund but has only $20 million to invest in the debt fund would be 
permitted to do so at that reduced level. If the investors in both funds are 
the identical, the other investors will have to contribute more than their 
pro rata share from the first fund in order to make up the $80 million 
shortfall. This discrepancy will give those other investors a 
disproportionate interest in the debt fund. If these investors are larger or 
more valuable to the general partner, which seems reasonable given their 
ability to contribute additional monies to the second fund, then the same 
potential conflict arises. Fund complexes may possible sort themselves 
along this dimension – in equilibrium, there may well be equity-only funds 
and equity and debt funds, in which investors agree ex ante to contribute 
to follow-on debt funds. We discuss these and other contractual solutions 
more fully below.  
Third, and related to the preceding capital constraints, are other 
restrictions investors may face on certain types of investments or sizes of 
investments. For example, the overarching investment guidelines for a 
university endowment or pension fund may restrict (a) the percentage of 
its assets that may be invested in private equity, (b) the percentage of these 
assets that may be invested in any one portfolio company or series of 
companies, (c) the particular types of investments (for example, distressed 
debt), or (d) any number of other options, which would effectively curtail 
the investor’s ability to participate in down-round investments in a way 
free from conflicts. These limitations may manifest themselves in rules, 
regulations, or contractual commitments. Most institutional investors—
from pension funds to insurance companies to university endowments—
are subject to some limitations upon their investing freedom, be it from 
federal capital adequacy requirements, investment duties owed under 
ERISA, state insurance regulations, or agreements with the stakeholders 
or investors behind the institutional investor. 
 
2. Tax Challenges to Unanimity 
 
Tax law may also complicate the situation, making the unanimity 
solution unlikely to arise in the market. The most pertinent potential 
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problem in the private equity context is the tax hit that comes when a firm 
retires its debt: the Internal Revenue Code requires a portfolio company to 
pay ordinary income tax rates on the difference between the par value of 
its outstanding debt and the amount paid by the company to retire the 
debt. The difference between par and market value paid is called 
“cancellation of indebtedness income” or COD.34 To take a simple 
example, if a portfolio company has $100 of outstanding bonds that are 
trading at discount to $80, the firm can buy back the debt but it must pay 
taxes on the $20 of COD that it receives as part of the transaction.  
The legal entity buying the debt of the portfolio company—the 
private equity manager—is not technically the portfolio company itself, but 
the Code does not permit this sort of structuring to evade COD tax 
obligations. Specifically, attribution rules of the Code provide that if a 
party related to a debtor buys debt issued by that debtor, then the debtor is 
treated as having bought the debt itself.35 The consequence of such 
attribution is that the debtor will have to recognize ordinary income in the 
amount of the difference between the face-value of the debt and the 
discounted price of the debt, just as if the portfolio company had directly 
retired its own debt. So, a fund deemed related to a portfolio company that 
buys the company's debt at 80 cents on the dollar will trigger 20 cents 
worth of ordinary income to the company, which then flows through with a 
negative impact upon the return to investors in the fund. 
This tax treatment may not be a barrier to efficient deals in some 
cases. For one, the benefits from owning the portfolio company’s debt may 
exceed any tax costs. A special case is where the portfolio company has 
accrued net operating losses that it can use to offset any recognition of 
income and therefore would not necessarily trigger the payment of any tax. 
Since many private equity targets are struggling businesses before the 
original LBO and may have an attractive set of losses on their balance 
sheets, the use of net operating losses may preserve efficient deals. 
Another example involves situations in which the debtor is bankrupt or in 
the vicinity of insolvency.36 The Code recognizes that COD is a transaction 
that does not generate cash, in the way income normally does, and 
therefore imposing a tax in cases involving cash-poor debtors would be 
ineffective and impose unnecessary costs on already frustrated creditors.  
Despite the existence of these special cases, COD taxes are 
considered by industry insiders to be a significant barrier to two-hat 
investing. In addition, these tax rules likely lead to inefficient contract 
design, in that they encourage investment entity structures that create 
rather than solve conflict of interest problems. As discussed below, if 
private equity firms can structure potentially tax-negative transactions in 
ways that attenuate the connection between the fund manager and the 
portfolio company, they may be able to avoid large taxes.  
                                                
34 Section 108 (Income from discharge of indebtedness). 
35 Section 108(e)(4) (Acquisition of indebtedness by person related to debtor). 
36 IRC 108(a)(1)(A), (B) (discharge occurs in a title 11 case or when taxpayer is insolvent). 
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Although media accounts of recent down-round investments 
contain little public information about the structure of such deals, they 
nevertheless offer some clues of what is taking place. Interviews we 
conducted with lawyers and principals in these deals also support the 
contention that deals to invest in down-round debt are being structured in 
ways that reduce tax burdens or side-step attempts to solve fiduciary duty 
problems.37 These impediments are exacerbating potential agency 
problems and conflicts of interest. 
 
(i) A Structural Solution to the Tax Challenge to Unanimity 
 
The most obvious way to reduce tax burdens that might accrue to 
the portfolio company (and therefore to the fund and its investors) is to 
obfuscate or minimize the general partner’s role in the down-round debt 
investment. As noted above, the cancellation of indebtedness is taxed if the 
debtor (in this case, the portfolio company) buys the debt. This rule also 
applies for parties related to the debtor, such as a general partner that 
owns a majority stake in the equity of the portfolio company. Thus if the 
fund of a general partner has a 100 percent ownership interest in the 
equity of a debtor, and the general partner starts a new fund to acquire the 
portfolio company’s debt, the acquisition will trigger a tax obligation for 
the portfolio company. If, however, the general partner attenuates its 
participation in the entity acquiring the debt it may, and we stress may, be 
able to avoid the tax hit. For example, the general partner could participate 
as a minority investor in the debt-acquiring fund, and thereby attempt to 
fit within the Code’s carve-out for acquisitions made by entities that own 
less than 50 percent of the debtor. The general partner might still convey 
its private information about the value of the debtor’s outstanding debt, 
and thus the fact of its investment would send sufficient signals to the 
majority investors in the debt-acquiring fund.  
The IRS may look askance at attempts to avoid taxes in this way, 
and therefore might deem that the portfolio company is under the control 
of the debt-acquiring fund, even when the fund is not controlled by the 
owner of the debtor’s equity. The Code gives it this authority: acquisition 
by partners or affiliated entities is couched in sufficiently broad terms—
“directly or indirectly”—to permit collapsing structures designed to avoid 
taxes. This sort of barrier, of course, merely gives general partners 
incentives to structure deals in even less transparent ways for limited 
partners. The broader implications of tax policy in this situation are 
somewhat beyond the scope of this essay. 
 
(ii) A Financial Solution to the Tax Challenge to Unanimity 
 
                                                
37 General partners, for instance, may attempt to obtain the consent of all investors. 
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Another way of avoiding taxes may be through the use of financial 
derivatives, such as total-return swaps.38 A total-return swap is a contract 
between two parties who agree to swap the returns from an asset (or 
combination of assets) for periodic cash payments, usually tied to a 
floating interest rate such as LIBOR. For example, a holder of debt (bonds, 
for instance) would agree to pay to a “buyer” of those bonds the total 
return (interest plus par value) from the bonds in return for monthly 
payments of a fixed amount above LIBOR plus a guarantee to make the 
“seller” whole in the event of default. The key legal feature of a total return 
swap is that the party owning the underlying debt does not transfer 
ownership to the buyer of the returns. The transaction is thus a synthetic 
sale.  
The application in the private equity context is plain. A general 
partner with private information about the value of a debtor’s outstanding 
bonds that wants to eliminate potential tax burdens or fiduciary conflicts 
arising from a lack of consent or unity of ownership interest could arrange 
to “buy” the debtor’s outstanding bonds or loans in a total-return swap. In 
this way, the general partner and its investors in the debt fund might avoid 
being deemed to “own” the underlying debt of the portfolio company, just 
returns that synthetically replicate those from the real debt; therefore, one 
might argue, the general partner’s legal obligations (either in taxes or 
state-law duties) would be reduced accordingly. 
Some anecdotal evidence suggests that private equity firms are 
using precisely this structure to reduce their legal costs, including perhaps 
the two preceding methods that we have identified. A recent news story 
described a typical down-round transaction as follows: 
 
Citi [,the owner of the portfolio company’s debt,] didn't sell 
the paper to the buyout groups, contrary to what's been 
reported. Rather, Citi and the [buyout] firms did so-called 
total-return swaps. The [buyout] firms forked over $3 billion 
of cash and agreed to pay Citi interest (at a low 1% over the 
London Interbank Offered Rate) on $7.8 billion. In return 
Citi will pay the firms the interest and principal repayments 
generated by the $12 billion portfolio. 
 
The article described the impetus for this contract choice as follows: 
“Doing a swap rather than a sale avoids various complex financial and 
legal problems.” Since these contracts are not publicly available, we can 
                                                
38 See, e.g., Kara Scannell, SEC Swaps Opinion May Aid Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., June 
6, 2008, at C8 (reporting an opinion by the SEC concluding that “hedge funds don’t need 
to count certain derivatives” – total-return equity swaps – “when determining how to 
report ownerships in companies”). It is possible that, like in the tax example above, the 
regulators—here the SEC or state courts—would deem holders of total return swaps to be 
“owners” for fiduciary duty purposes. After all, it is the economic impact of a contract that 
is germane for conflict of interest purposes; the other sticks in the ownership bundle may 
be relevant, but they are much less important. Whether or not these interests should be 
treated this way is an open question, however, and is not at all obvious.  
  One Hat Too Many?  /  19 
only speculate that these “problems” are, or at least include, the tax and 
practical issues we have raised above. If true, this characterization points 
out the potential design work-arounds that fund managers are using, and 
potentially the conflicts of interest they are creating as a result. If 
unremedied, these approaches are likely to beget litigation from jilted or 
disappointed investors. 
 
(iii) Normative Thoughts on Private Equity Tax Rules 
 
We established above that existing tax rules create incentives for 
fund managers to structure their investments in inefficient ways. At some 
level, complaining that the current tax rules inhibit potentially efficient 
transactions is like complaining that sleeping is an inefficient use of time. 
Every tax rule is inefficient from this perspective, but the government 
needs the money, so there. There are, however, legitimate questions about 
the purpose of the COD tax rules, and whether this purpose is furthered in 
the case of down-round investments by private equity firms. If, for 
example, private equity investments are normatively a net benefit to social 
welfare, and if the tax rules contribute to structural obfuscation and thus 
buried conflicts of interest, then the net gains from the current rules might 
be slight or even negative.  
It is important to note a few things here. For one, the social welfare 
calculation is not obvious or easy. Gains to the fund will be at the expense 
of the existing firm shareholders, but these are likely the same over the 
broad economy. From an ex ante perspective and behind the veil, investors 
will not know whether they are investors in a fund or are investors in a 
firm being bought out by a fund. In any event, so long as the value of the 
firm is increased, the question of distribution, unless systemically biased 
in the favor of one class or another, should be irrelevant. In other words, 
likely social gains from the discipline of the market for (private) corporate 
control would then be the determining factor in any social welfare 
calculation.  
 
B. Contractual Consent and Waiver by Investors 
 
 Another potential solution, which is related to the unanimity 
solution discussed above, is waiver of conflicts through private ordering 
among the advisers of private equity funds and their investors. This is a 
simple solution that has the virtues of being readily available and relatively 
inexpensive to implement.  On the investor side, for instance, limited 
partners in an equity fund that are given an opportunity to invest in a 
potentially conflicting debt fund and, after receiving sufficient information 
to make an informed decision, agree, might be construed as a waiving any 
fiduciary duties.  On the adviser side, another contractual solution is for 
the general partner in a fund, as adviser, t0 agree via contract to forswear 
certain investments; specifically, those transactions that are most likely to 
place the adviser in conflict with the limited partners in the fund.  
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Consider the investor waivers first. Although pure fiduciary duties, 
like those of a trustee, cannot be waived, more modest fiduciary duties, 
like those that arise by law in voluntary contractual relationships are 
sometimes viewed as waivable. This waivability is especially true when the 
parties are sophisticated and capable of fending for themselves, which is 
likely to be the case in the sort of investment partnerships we are 
discussing here. Notwithstanding the less stringent species of fiduciary 
duties that obtain in these cases, the idea of a waiver will likely be 
determined by the particular facts of the case. For example, an investor 
who agrees at the time of the initial investment in an equity fund to 
authorize the general partner to invest in the debt of the portfolio company 
(whether or not the investor will tag along) will probably be construed as 
waiving a subsequent claim to breach of duty on those grounds. In 
contrast, given the size and duration of financial commitments needed for 
down-round investments in private equity, a limited partner’s decision not 
to invest after an equity commitment has already been made may be 
viewed skeptically and as an invalid waiver by courts sensitive to 
constraints upon the limited partner, such as a lack of funds or restrictive 
investment guidelines.39 
The demand for this contractual solution could arise from either the 
general partner in its efforts to attract capital at a profitable cost, or from 
the limited partners who insist upon such a voluntary renunciation as a 
condition of any investment. This is a potentially important distinction. If 
the demand comes from limited partners, it is possible that some investors 
will use side-letters to reach special deals on this point, and, absent a 
general most-favored-nation policy, may lead to heterogeneity across 
investors with respect to limits on follow-on investments. This risk may be 
somewhat less if the general partner needs to include these to attract 
capital broadly from this asset class. Looking forward many years, we 
expect some sort of new equilibrium in which these conflicts are solved, 
either by contract or otherwise, and priced by the market. 
 Consider now the advisor-side waivers. To a certain extent, limited 
partnership agreements already contain provisions restricting the general 
partner’s ability to invest in certain investments, typically for strategic or 
tax reasons.40 In some such circumstances, the general partner must either 
abandon those transactions or obtain certain approvals, either from each 
limited partner, a majority of limited partners, or the fund’s advisory 
board. These restrictions, however, are intended primarily to focus the 
fund’s investment strategy or to comply with regulatory restrictions such 
as those imposed by ERISA, as opposed to minimizing fiduciary conflicts. 
Moreover, to the extent that investment restrictions exist in a limited 
                                                
39 Whatever the likely outcome of these potential cases, the fact remains that for all 
existing deals, ex ante waiver is impossible. There may be a new future equilibrium in 
which investors sort themselves into funds based on expected future investments with full 
information, but this practice is certainly not current true or within sight. 
40 See Telephone Interview with David Chapin, partner, Ropes & Gray LLP (May 9, 
2008). 
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partnership agreement, those limitations will most typically apply only to 
the general partner’s activity with respect to the investments of the 
particular fund in question, not necessarily to the general partner’s (or its 
affiliates’) activities in other funds. Nevertheless, one could easily envisage 
the expansion of such provisions to bar deleterious investments beyond 
merely the specific fund in question.41 
 
1. The Challenge of Monitoring Contractual Agreements 
 
 Given the obviousness of contracting around this question and, 
indeed, the maturity and prevalence of rigorously negotiated limited 
partnership agreements in the private equity industry, one might begin by 
asking why practitioners have not attempted to order this issue privately 
already. The readiest answer might be that the thorniness of adviser-
investor conflicts is only now becoming apparent in what has been a 
rapidly evolving marketplace. A related explanation is that this problem 
may not be obvious to investors in a single private equity fund, only to 
those who are aware of the general partner’s potentially conflicting 
activities in other funds or via other investment vehicles. 
 A more substantive limitation with private ordering is its 
vulnerability to imperfect monitoring. Investors or their intermediaries 
must be able to monitor an adviser’s fidelity to contractual provisions in 
order for private ordering to be effective. In the private equity context, this 
monitoring will require limited partners to know what their general 
partner is doing.  Investors must know not only what investments the 
general partner is making in the investors’ own fund (which should be 
readily verifiable) but also what investments the general partner is making 
through other funds in the adviser’s complex (which could be difficult if 
the investors are not investors in those other funds). Perhaps even more 
challenging for limited partners might be observing what investments are 
being made through other investment vehicles managed by other 
investment advisers under the money manager’s broadest organizational 
ambit – such as distantly affiliated vulture funds or hedge funds. 
Obviously, the less related the investment vehicle, the more remote the 
possibility that investors will be able to monitor the adviser’s activity. The 
complexity and variations of investment practices make the task of 
monitoring privately agreed-upon arrangements a serious challenge. 
 A prime example of the costs of imperfect monitoring comes from 
the recent mutual fund timing scandal. Mutual fund managers promised 
                                                
41 The broader investing world already contains examples of investment advisers 
voluntarily renouncing activities that are not otherwise statutorily proscribed in order to 
create a prophylaxis against conflicts in order to attract and retain investment. In the 
mutual fund industry, for instance, investment advisers regularly adopted policies that 
prohibited market timing in their funds before they were required to do so by statutes and 
regulations governing registered investment companies.  See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, 
Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 
80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1453 (2006). 
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investors they would not engage in market timing, which had the 
consequence of favoring one set of investors (and fund managers) over 
another set. But the profits to be made by reneging on this promise were 
too great to prohibit the fund managers from resisting the lure of market 
timing. Although the breaches were eventually uncovered, and mutual 
fund managers paid billions in settlements, this example points to the 
limits of voluntary waivers in a world of imperfect monitoring. In fact, 
unlike the mutual fund industry, in which market timing eventually came 
to light and was rigorously prosecuted by a host of regulators, the private 
equity field is not overseen by a similarly elaborate regulatory structure. 
Given its comparatively unregulated environment, the private equity 
industry might present more challenges and impose higher costs for 
monitoring upon limited partners. 
 
2. Additional Challenges to Contractual Agreements 
 
 Assuming the foregoing challenges of contractual solutions to 
adviser-investor conflicts could be overcome, we need not assume that 
limited partners would demand a blanket prohibition on advisers from 
acquiring any potentially contradictory investment positions. Surely the 
more nuanced – and wealth-maximizing – approach might instead be for 
limited partners either to require prior approval for such transactions or to 
demand a participation in the adviser’s financial gains from such 
transactions. Such an approach would grant to limited partners the 
flexibility of assessing the value of such transactions and permitting those 
that made financial sense. Similarly, general partners need not be chilled 
against all such transactions – including potentially lucrative deals – but 
instead could be encouraged to evaluate the total value of an investment, 
taking into consideration any investors’ participation, and then propose 
and pursue deals that remain mutually profitable. 
 Expansive notions of fiduciary duties, however, may prevent just 
such a sophisticated and jointly beneficial arrangement.42 A strict 
interpretation of fiduciary duties would prohibit an investor from 
authorizing conflicted transactions on the grounds that such approval 
would amount to an impermissible attempt to waive fiduciary duties. This 
paternalistic construction of fiduciary duties mandates that those duties 
are imposed precisely to override attempts by trustees to hornswoggle 
their beneficiaries into signing away legal protections. Needless to say, the 
limited partners involved in multi-million dollar private equity 
investments are extremely sophisticated parties, whose interests are well 
protected by the sentinels of wealth, legal representation, and financial 
expertise – they certainly would not benefit from the mandatory 
imposition of crude and inflexible common law dictates.  
 
                                                
42 Cf. Douglas Baird & Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008). 
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3. Future Possibilities for Contractual Agreements 
 
A vibrant academic, judicial, and practical debate addresses the 
legitimacy of limited partners waiving their rights to fiduciary treatment 
by general partners. We suspect, but do not know, that waiver of some 
kind is currently practiced within the private equity industry in some 
circumstances. What we can say with some certainty is that to the extent 
waivers were used before, surely the use will now diminish in the near-
term. For one, in the wake of down-round investments by private equity 
firms, limited partners will be suspicious that the general partner is going 
to make conflicting investments (and thus be wary about giving the 
general partner that latitude). In addition, limited partners will know that 
they can hold out and demand ransom for that risk. (This problem is the 
consequence of not receiving ex ante authorization for follow-on 
investments.) Perhaps general partners will be willing to pay the price and 
so the actual number of waivers will return to their preexisting levels, but 
certainly their price will first go up, and thus lead to a short-term 
diminution, in their usage. 
It is difficult to imagine anyone objecting to ex ante waiver if the 
party waiving is sophisticated, capable of bearing losses, and informed. If 
an investor decides to permit down-round investments, whether or not it 
decides to be a participant by bargaining for tag-along rights, this decision 
should be respected and fall upon the responsibility of the investment 
manager. All or nearly all investors in private equity satisfy these 
prerequisites, so waiver should not be troubling. If private equity becomes 
a retail investment, however, agency costs may increase and this may 
make waiver more problematic.43  
Mid-stream waivers are more problematic, in that there may be an 
element of coercion involved that clouds the legitimacy of any waiver. 
Given this likely interpretation by courts, at least in Delaware but more 
likely everywhere, we expect new private equity contracts to include 
specific provisions on the propriety of follow-on investments, specifically 
in portfolio company debt. And, given the problems about verifiability and 
monitoring of contractual promises by general partners not to invest, we 
should expect to see most general partners seeking authority to make such 
investments.  
One way of reducing the uncertainty inherent in the waiver 
discussion above is to eliminate the concept of fiduciary duties 
altogether.44  In private investing, eliminating fiduciary duties explicitly 
                                                
43 This is beyond the scope of this essay. We will say that waiver should not be a problem 
in well-functioning markets, since faithful agents of retail investors should make the 
waiver decision in the way likely to increase the return to all investors. But these markets 
will not necessarily work so well for reasons described elsewhere. 
44 See Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1309 (2008). In calling for the replacing fiduciary duties with contract, Baird and 
Henderson argue that the uncertainty generated by a fiduciary overhang on contractual 
choice reduces the value of ex ante bargains that are well struck but beyond the ken of 
those sitting in ex post judgment, especially when the deal turns out badly. 
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would put investors on notice that they must protect themselves by 
contract. This position would force issues, like the propriety of down-
round investing, to the surface and clarify the rights and responsibilities of 
the partners. To be sure, there may remain interpretive questions about 
the scope of the bargains that are struck and on the role of courts in cases 
where one party deviates from its promises, as in the mutual fund timing 
example above, but the level of uncertainty would be dramatically reduced. 
Big Boy letters, which many courts are enforcing,45 are a good example of 
this, since they are a de facto waiver of fiduciary duties to resolve 
information asymmetries in the trading of debt instruments. Parties to 
these deals are comfortable with what they know and with what they don’t 
know, and price reflects these unknowns. Pricing litigation risk is much 
trickier, and litigation generates no social value that cannot be achieved by 
contract in these cases.  
We do not expect courts to get out of the fiduciary duty business 
entirely, although the Delaware legislature has come close to commanding 
them to do so in certain limited partnership cases, but we can urge courts 
to enforce vigorously the private bargains that are well struck. If they do 
this, the discussion of fiduciary duties collapses back to waiver and to 
freedom of contract, which is where it should reside. 
 
C. Exit: A Secondary Market for Private Equity Interests 
 
Another solution to the conflicts we’ve described is to provide exit 
options for investors. Conflicts of interest are ubiquitous in business law, 
and a standard solution or ameliorating factor is the existence of a liquid 
trading market that facilitates exit for investors. After all, if participants in 
an enterprise can sell their interests quickly and at a price likely to reflect 
actual value, this provides a strong incentive for the managers of the 
enterprise to act responsibly and in the interests of investors.46 If exit is 
not available, the law, following from Albert Hirschman,47 generally 
provides stakeholders with voice over corporate affairs in order to reduce 
agency costs. In other words, in the absence of a say over corporate affairs, 
so long as investors have a viable exit option, the risk of managerial 
misbehavior is reduced.  
If limited partners in private equity funds enjoyed liquid and 
transparent means of withdrawing from their investments, they would 
neither need the vigorous protection of fiduciary duties nor be constrained 
by those duties from voluntarily and contractually ordering their affairs 
                                                
45 For a discussion of “Big Boy” letters and the leading cases, see M. Todd Henderson, 
Deconstructing Duff & Phelps, ___ U. CHI. L. REV. __ (2007). 
46 Examples include the market-out exception for appraisal proceedings; the general 
market for corporate control; and greater judicial oversight in close corporations. For a 
leading case, see Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976) 
(holding co-promoters in close corporation owe fiduciary duties to other shareholders). 
47 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
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otherwise. Market exits permit investors to protect themselves against the 
poor decisions of advisers while simultaneously disciplining advisers from 
making such decisions in the first instance. Managers operating in 
markets in which individuals can quickly exit take care to minimize this 
possibility. A well functioning market solution is clearly preferable to the 
vagaries of judicial process, and correspondingly, judicial authorities are 
wont to impose fiduciary duties when investors have the ability to walk 
away from their investment financially unscathed.48 
A vibrant secondary market of this sort would likely deter conflicts 
of interest, in the same way that the liquid capital markets for the shares of 
publicly held corporations do. A market for private equity interests akin to 
the market for corporate control in public companies would provide 
discipline on managers, as well as an escape hatch to lessen the losses in 
the event of misbehavior.  
As it happens, the private equity industry has developed such a 
method for exit: disgruntled limited partners can, subject to certain 
restrictions, sell their interest in a private equity fund to another investor. 
This secondary market for private equity interests, however, is still 
relatively nascent, hampered by its lack of transparency, and, most 
importantly, bogged down by current legal rules that make market 
transactions more costly than necessary to achieve efficient outcomes. This 
problem – the law getting in the way of market solutions to resolve 
conflicts and increase the number of mutually beneficial transactions – is a 
common theme in this essay.49 With greater scrutiny and well-considered 
suggestions for maturation, this secondary market could prove to be an 
avenue for improving the overall health of the private equity industry 
generally and the problem with adviser-investor conflicts specifically. 
 In order to better understand this potential solution, it is worth 
considering a brief history of the market. The secondary market for private 
equity interests has existed for as long as the idea of private equity.50 From 
the time of the industry’s creation, the standard limited partnership 
agreement has permitted limited partners to transfer their interests to 
others, subject to the consent of a fund’s general partner. Notwithstanding 
this long-standing option for exit, the secondary market has not always 
been particularly active or well advertised. Prior to the late 1990s, a 
limited partner who felt the need to withdraw from a private equity 
investment was rarely eager to broadcast that news widely, lest it generate 
a market perception that the limited partner was in financial distress. 
Given the nature of limited partners and their widespread financial 
                                                
48 Hence we see a sliding scale of fiduciary duties, with increasing seriousness as liquid 
secondary markets are less available. Close corporations, for example, are subject to 
much greater judicial oversight than public ones. 
49 As in the case of the unanimity solution discussed above, legal rules, like fiduciary 
duties, COD tax regulations, and now partnership taxation rules, are barriers to optimal 
private ordering. 
50 See Telephone Interview with Harold Hope, managing director, Goldman Sachs & Co. 
(May 5, 2008).  
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interests, they preferred to keep any premature need for liquidity quiet for 
fear that such disclosure might prove a damaging revelation to their other 
business interests. 
 The stigma associated with sales of private equity interests 
disappeared during the 2000s. Some prominent investors—for example, 
David Swenson, who managed Yale University’s endowment—earned 
spectacular returns by rebalancing their portfolios away from traditional 
allocations in equity and fixed income securities and towards alternative 
asset classes like private equity funds. This approach required regular 
tweaking of asset allocations, thus generating a need for a secondary 
market in less-liquid assets. At the same time, the banking industry 
generated strong volume in this secondary market with their need for cash 
to meet solvency requirements and consolidation activities.51 Also, during 
the bust of the Internet equity boom, huge investment pools that had been 
raised to invest in now-unappetizing technology and Internet equities 
needed to find alternative investments, such as private equity deals. With a 
limited number of potential private equity investments, but large amounts 
of capital looking for private equity returns, secondary markets became 
more lucrative, and thus concerns about stigma dissipated. 
The ultimate exit strategy for secondary acquirers is typically to 
hold the limited partnership interests until the maturity of the private 
equity fund. Because the volume of sales of limited partnership interests 
typically rises during a bear market – when original investors develop 
unforeseen needs for cash – the activity and success of secondary funds is 
somewhat countercyclical, providing another reason for their appeal to 
large and variegated investors. 
Some of the largest buyers in this space are themselves private 
equity funds, formed with the express purpose of acquiring these interests 
and, like all private equity funds, eager to boost returns using leverage and 
expertise within this particular market niche. Coller Capital, Lexington 
Partners, and Goldman Sachs are among the leading secondary buyers, 
each with multiple billion-dollar funds dedicated to this strategy. The 
appeal of this business is multifaceted: 
 
For buyers, secondhand assets are more mature, and 
therefore less risky, especially in a venture portfolio. They 
can also be sold more quickly. On average, secondary 
investments are held for two to three years rather than three 
to five – so investors see returns sooner.52 
 
When acquiring these positions, secondary buyers must determine the 
present value for an investment whose initial cost is dated and whose 
ultimate valuation is speculative. Depending on the performance of the 
private equity fund’s portfolio, therefore, a secondary buyer may pay either 
                                                
51 Marietta Cauchi, Coller Capital Steps Up U.S. Presence, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2005, 
quoting Frank Morgan, head of Coller Capital’s New York office. 
52 Id. 
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a premium or a discount to take the place of the original limited partner. 
Obviously, determining an accurate – yet ultimately profitable – price 
requires an intensive and diligent process of research into not only the 
fund’s specific portfolio investments but also the general partner’s track 
record and future strategy.  
 Contrary to what outsiders might expect, secondary purchasers 
apparently do not attempt to renegotiate the terms of limited partnership 
interests. One could imagine a particularly powerful secondary purchaser 
– Goldman Sachs, for instance – asking for side-letter concessions that 
would increase the value of its investment, such as preferable pricing 
terms on management or carry fees and unique most-favored-nation 
clauses. Lawyers and bankers familiar with these transactions, however, 
maintain that secondary purchasers do not typically ask for these 
concessions.53  
At one level, this is difficult to believe, and the denials we hear may 
be simply propaganda of a sort. After all, if investors are treated differently 
(through side letters) depending on their value to the general partner (in 
this and future deals), a prominent buyer of interests who consolidates 
multiple, diffuse interests into a larger pool may be able to extract rents 
from the general partner. In fact, an investment strategy might simply be 
to consolidate ownership stakes and earn a better deal through 
negotiation. General partners would be expected to resist this, of course, 
and given the power they typically possess in limited partnership 
agreements (for example, veto rights over the identity of secondary 
purchasers), this may explain the current difficulties in a renegotiation 
strategy. In addition, consolidating claims would reduce their liquidity, 
since there would be fewer buyers for larger and larger blocks of 
ownership interests. This too may reduce the desirability of assembling 
large blocks of secondary market interests. There is a bit of a paradox here, 
however, since the secondary market would be more robust if profits could 
be earned in this way. Ultimately, however, the existence of a market with 
traders of different risk preference and tolerance, should be sufficient to 
provide the kind of pricing and discipline needed to reduce or solve the 
conflicts problem. 
 Curiously, the general partners of private equity funds have 
generally been cool to the development of a secondary market. One might 
assume that, to the contrary, general partners would conclude that easier 
exit options ex post would encourage greater enthusiasm – and thus better 
pricing – for initial private equity investments ex ante. Yet the prospect of 
having to deal with a new limited partner and the substitution process 
appears to have dimmed the enthusiasm by general partners for these 
transactions. Every industry insider with whom we discussed this topic 
stated that general partners do not appear interested in encouraging the 
growth of a robust secondary market in their limited partnership interests. 
                                                
53 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Raj Marphatia, partner, Ropes & Gray LLP (May 5, 
2008). 
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The attitude of general partners appears to be that this market does not 
convey a benefit to them, only administrative costs and potential liabilities 
from unvetted investors. 
 A common demand by general partners is that the acquirer of the 
interest be an existing limited partner within the fund, thereby eliminating 
any need to audit the new investor for possible legal or regulatory 
problems. Another demand from a general partner might be for the new 
limited partner to agree to what is known as a “staple deal.” In a staple 
deal, a secondary investor who acquires an interest in a private equity fund 
commits to certain capital contributions to future funds launched by the 
general partner, thus tying – or stapling – the two transactions together. 
Presumably, the administrative friction of approving the secondary 
transaction will subsequently be offset by the correspondingly diminished 
logistical challenges involved with future fund commitments. 
 Notwithstanding this lack of ardor by general partners, the 
secondary market has grown into a significant industry. Participants in the 
business estimate that approximately 5 percent of limited partnership 
interests will trade hands over their typical ten-year life. In a private equity 
universe that raises approximately $200 billion each year, funds that 
specialize in secondary acquisitions raise approximately $15 billion 
annually, an amount which of course is leveraged to acquire a much higher 
dollar value of limited partnership interests. A recent investment by 
Goldman Sachs shows that this market shows is vibrant and growing 
dramatically.54 
 A potential legal barrier to the full development of a robust 
secondary market is the set of rules governing the taxation and trading 
restrictions for “publicly traded partnerships” (PTPs). Congress amended 
the tax code in 1987 to tax PTPs as corporations unless nearly all of the 
PTP’s income derived from “passive” sources, such as capital gains or 
dividends.55 In addition, current Treasury regulations provide that these 
partnership interests may not be traded on a public exchange if (a) the 
interests are unregistered (as will be the case with most private equity 
fund interests, which are almost never registered56); and (b) the fund has 
                                                
54 See Peter Lattman, Goldman Goes All In on 'Secondary' Bet, Bank-Led Group to Pay 
About $1.5 Billion For Portfolio of Private-Equity Investments, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 
2008, at C1 (describing Goldman as “doubling down” in a $1.5 billion investment in a 
portfolio of secondary market private equity investments). 
55 See IRC, section 7704(b)-(d). There is a robust debate in the academic literature and in 
the Congress on the tax rates that should apply to private equity compensation structures. 
Compare Vic Fleischer, Two & Twenty: Taxing Partnership Interests in Private Equity 
Funds, __ N.Y.U. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2008) (arguing for taxing the 20 percent as 
regular income); and David A. Weisbach, Essay: The Taxation of Carried Interests in 
Private Equity, 94 U. VA. L. REV. 751 (2008) (arguing for the current tax treatment). See 
also 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/sitepages/leg/LEG%202007/Leg%20110%20061407.pdf 
(proposed bill of Senators Baucus and Grassley). 
56  The exception to this overwhelming rule is the now-public private equity firms, like 
Blackstone. Ironically, it is the IPO of these firms that is driving reconsideration of these 
tax rules.  
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more than 100 investors during any given year.57  These requirements may 
be difficult but not impossible to satisfy, so a secondary exchange can 
theoretically exist. But registration is costly (in direct costs and in 
transparency, which may reveal proprietary strategies and open the firm 
up to litigation), and it will, on the margin, deter liquidity in secondary 
markets. Some markets have arisen, such as the NYPPEX, which hosts a 
$10 billion secondary market in private equity interests.58 This exchange 
purports to avoid the PTP rules – citing an IRS private letter ruling to that 
effect – by arguing that the interests are not publicly traded because the 
exchange is not a real “exchange,” since it isn't open to the public (it 
requires a password and lots of money to invest), the amounts are small 
percentages of the funds in question, and so forth. In other words, the 
investors in this exchange can fend for themselves, and therefore 
regulation is unnecessary.59  
 In order to encourage secondary markets, which in turn have the 
salutary effect of minimizing agency costs and conflicts of interest in 
desegregated investments, existing regulations on secondary markets 
should be liberalized. Placing inordinate restrictions on the secondary 
exchange of private equity interests (as the current Treasury regulations 
do) is problematic because huge benefits would flow from a vibrant 
secondary exchange and these are sophisticated parties who don't need 
this kind of protection. Only four or five enormous investment houses 
currently trade in this market, and given that the private equity direct 
market is populated solely by large pension funds, university endowments, 
and other qualified institutional buyers (QIBs), it is reasonable to believe 
and except the secondary market to contain the most sophisticated 
investors that exist. 
Although a full treatment of these regulations and their 
(in)efficiency is beyond the scope of this essay, it is likely that there is a 
reworking of the rules that can satisfy both the needs of the tax authorities 
and the encouragement of a robust secondary market in private equity 
interests. To the extent that this market could be nurtured and expanded, 
it might provide more meaningful exit options to limited partners who are 
troubled by the conflicted investments of general partners. Ideally, some 
day trading desks on which secondary interests are regularly priced would 
generate far more liquid transactions in these interests. Limited partners 
who would be willing to submit information about themselves to general 
partners could be preapproved for transfers – to assuage the concerns of 
general partners that prefer to deal with investors already inside their 
funds. Both advisers and investors would then enjoy the far-reaching 
benefits of a smoothly operating secondary market. 
                                                
57 See Treas. Reg.§ 1.7704-1(h)(1). See also 
http://www.nyppe.com/LinkDocs/IRSCode11.7704Text.pdf.  
58 See http://www.nyppe.com/Funds.aspx.  
59 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7704.00-00, (undated), available at 
http://www.nyppe.com/LinkDocs/IRSNYPPEPLRwoIRS111.10.04.pdf. 
30  /  Birdthistle & Henderson 
 If current regulatory barriers are removed, we would expect the 
nascent markets for these investments to mature naturally, and with this 
the problems we describe in this essay to be reduced. As this happens, the 
strictness of fiduciary duties and the limits of waiver should be adjusted 
accordingly. Just as publicly traded firms owe lower duties, so too should 
publicly traded private equity investments reflect the value of easy exit. 
Law can help develop these markets by removing obstacles to trading and 
by generating standardized forms and default rules. Standardization of 
contracts can happen spontaneously, through trade groups, or via the 
encouragement of disclosure models like menus and default rules. 
 
D. Diversification 
 
Investors can also reduce the costs of any conflict (theoretically to 
zero) by holding a diversified portfolio of private equity investments. The 
intuition, which is well supported by the finance literature, is that a fully 
diversified investor will sometimes suffer losses in, say, an equity fund due 
to a general partner’s conflict of interest in another fund, but these losses 
will be offset by gains in other, say, debt funds in which the conflicted 
general partner favors them. Ex ante and behind the veil, an investor 
diversified in equity and debt funds will expect to win sometimes and lose 
sometimes, and as long as investors are diversified across portfolios, these 
conflicts shouldn’t matter.  
There are some caveats and important clarifying points that must 
be made. As a threshold matter, the theory does not currently fit with 
reality. Investors are not diversified across funds, and lawyers and fund 
managers we interviewed, suggest that conflicts are a real problem for 
their clients and investors. There are several reasons for the current lack of 
diversification. Investments in private equity funds are typically quite 
large – an average might be about $100 million – and being well 
diversified across many funds would be a very expense form of conflict 
insurance. This is exacerbated by the lock in of capital currently required 
for most investments.  
 
1. Intra-Fund Manager Diversification 
 
Intra-fund manager diversification would involve an investor 
investing across the entire range of funds sponsored by a particular 
general partner, or at least those with potential conflicts. There can be no 
conflict between Fund A (equity) and Fund B (debt) if the investors in both 
are perfectly overlapping in identity and interest, and have voluntarily 
contracted for their investment stakes. After all, any decision made by the 
general partner to favor Fund B over Fund A is simply moving money from 
an investor’s one pocket to its other.  
This kind of diversification could be achieved by giving investors a 
right of first refusal to invest in any fund sponsored by the general partner, 
especially those in which the new fund may take a conflicting position in a 
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portfolio company in which the investor is already committed. Since the 
potential for conflict is not always readily apparent at the time of the fund 
formation, the right of first refusal might be sensibly be offered on all new 
funds. In addition, since the potential for conflict, or the magnitude of the 
conflict, might not be apparent to even sophisticated investors, some 
disclosure by the general partner as to the potential for conflict and its 
expected impact would be sensible. A more radical approach would be to 
require a staple-deal for follow-on debt funds in all cases. Such an 
approach would be increase costs on all deals, even where not needed, and 
will deter private equity investments on the margin.  
One potential problem with this “solution” is that the general 
partner may have reason to obfuscate its down-round investment to avoid 
the tax hit from buying back the debt of an affiliated entity. A staple-deal, 
for example, is tax disadvantaged compared with more elaborate 
structures in which there is not unity of ownership. There are very few 
public details about the nature of these down-round investments, so we 
cannot know, and undoubtedly not all limited partners know, about how 
they are structured. Since the IRS may treat obvious structures as 
equivalent to joint ownership for the purposes of COD tax obligations, 
general partners may have incentives to be as opaque as possible, even to 
some or all limited partners.  
Even the most simple tax-avoidance structure—creating a joint 
venture with other investment managers in which the general manager 
owns less than 50 percent—is not easily diversifiable for existing equity 
fund investors. The general partner could offer each limited partner in a 
potentially conflicting equity fund a pro rata share of the general partner’s 
interest in the joint venture debt fund. This might allay some concerns, but 
it might not offer full protection, because the general partner will be 
outvoted by the other co-venturers in the fund (a prerequisite of favorable 
tax treatment), and the general partner might be compensated beyond its 
ownership stake in ways that would create a conflict where the pure 
investment stakes would suggest there isn’t one. 
 
2. Inter-Fund Manager Diversification 
 
Inter-fund manager diversification, on the other hand, would 
involve an investor holding a mixed portfolio of equity and debt 
investments from a variety of different general partners. With a sufficient 
number of investments, the investor should be less concerned with conflict 
of interest (or, perhaps, indifferent to it), even if it does not own offsetting 
positions in a particular fund or specific investment. This is because the 
investor will expect at the time of the investment to win some and lose 
some; unless the wins or losses are systematically biased, the investor 
should be indifferent. As discussed above, this type of diversification is not 
currently practiced or even possible.  
We certainly can imagine investment products that would serve this 
portfolio diversification function. Recent years have seen a spate of similar 
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diversification products created for underlying securities that were 
traditionally considered illiquid and chunky. For example, bank loans were 
traditionally originated and held by the lender for the term of the loan. 
Lenders could sell loans, but the market was small, trading was thin, and 
borrowers often restricted such loan sales through contract. (The analogy 
to limited partners selling their private equity interests is nearly perfect.) 
In the past decade, however, credit derivatives have been created that 
allow ownership interests to be more dynamic, say by allowing the lender 
to offload some of the risk of default. There could be exchange-traded 
funds (ETFs), indexes, and secondary derivative markets for these 
investments without upsetting the primary market. If these products and 
markets develop, it will greatly reduce the too-many-hats problem we 
describe. 
 
E. Architectural Protections from Conflicts 
  
 Perhaps the simplest means of addressing potential adviser-
investor conflicts in private equity funds is the approach already widely 
adopted in the industry: architectural protections. By engineering 
structures that are intended to segregate the activities of different 
investment divisions, advisers can unilaterally attempt to assuage their 
investors that no nefarious activities are consciously being undertaken. Of 
course, while the adoption of these segregation techniques signals a 
certain fidelity to fiduciary principles, they suffer from lamentable yet 
inescapable limitations. 
Advisers have long since erected communication barricades 
between themselves and their affiliates within the same money manager’s 
broad corporate structure. Accordingly, investment personnel, computer 
servers, client files, and similar administrative systems are often 
segregated, electronically and geographically, from one another. Any 
decisions subsequently made by a private equity fund to acquire distressed 
debt of a portfolio company of, for example, a hedge fund within the same 
corporate structure can therefore be dismissed as coincidental and without 
malicious intent.  
These sorts of firewalls have long existed within professional 
services firms to deal with conflicts of interest. Because they cost money to 
install and impose operational inefficiencies upon the adviser, they are at 
the very least a means by which an adviser may post a bond to 
demonstrate the adviser’s seriousness of purpose. And beyond just good 
optics, these barriers may succeed in preventing mundane or low-level 
sharing of information across investment divisions. 
The problem, of course, is that every money manager, no matter 
how sprawling and multifaceted, ultimately owes all obedience to a unified 
management structure at the top. There will always be at least one person, 
therefore, who is aware of the conflicting positions being taken by the firm 
as a whole. Because that person no doubt has the authority to approve or 
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disapprove of specific investment decisions, architectural protections are, 
in the final analysis, largely cosmetic.  
Another similar solution would be to formalize or even legally 
require the use of independent advisory boards. Advisory boards currently 
comprise representatives from existing limited partners, and these 
investors can be expected to be rather imperfect monitors of conflict of 
interests from which they are the most likely beneficiaries. An 
“independent” board of advisors might provide a more robust check on 
conflicts, but this solution just pushes the problem back a level to 
questions about who appoints the independent advisors, who is 
independent, and how and to whom is the board accountable. The 
problems with and costs of this solution have been raised elsewhere in the 
context of such boards for mutual fund complexes.60 
To the extent that other, contractual or market, mechanisms 
develop for policing and enforcing adviser-investor conflicts more 
effectively, these architectural provisions might best be removed to save 
costs to all parties. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In this piece, we have described the new investing environment in 
private equity and the potential conflicts that it is likely to create, offered 
reasons why existing law and regulation exacerbate instead of reduce these 
conflicts, and proposed remedies for limited partners and the law. Our 
approach throughout is one of respect for well-struck bargains by the 
sophisticated investors involved in these cases, tempered by an awareness 
that the old equilibrium is no more, the state of the market today is in flux, 
and the new equilibrium is one that we can still improve by setting the 
right role for law.  
We hope to have shown that the desegregation of finance has come 
to private equity and its impact, although now unknown, is likely to 
reshape significantly the way in which funds are formed and operated. 
Private equity firms are now beginning to invest in the debt of firms that 
they took private, with the consequence of creating a potential conflict of 
interest among different investors in equity and debt funds managed by 
the firm. Although unanimity of investors (or consent) is a solution to this 
problem, we show why this is unlikely to be the case, generally, and why it 
has not been the case for deals that have already been done. Reasons 
include are practical considerations that have little to do with external law, 
such as the limits on investment types or amounts in the founding 
documents of investors in these funds. We point out, however, that tax 
rules inhibit the resolution or pricing of these conflicts by giving fund 
managers incentives to make their potentially conflicting transactions less 
                                                
60 The fact that advisory board members are investors cuts both ways. These investors are 
likely to know the business well, but they may also be preferred investors who are given 
special treatment (and thus have clouded judgment) in the conflict cases we describe in 
this essay. 
34  /  Birdthistle & Henderson 
transparent. Fiduciary duties are not a help either, since they create 
residual risk of liability, even in the face of seemingly valid waivers.  
We offer some potential solutions – and explore their limitations – 
based on experiences in other investment markets. The existence of a 
secondary market in private equity interests represents the most 
promising mechanism for reducing agency costs, of which the down-round 
conflict is merely one example. In a world in which investment interests 
are priced and relatively freely transferable, the pressures on fund 
managers to behave would be much stronger. The law can aid this market 
by interpreting contractual choice, especially in new funds, in light of the 
principals of freedom of contract and clarity of form set forth here. 
Investors are unlikely ever to ever fully offset the risk of potential conflicts 
of interest, but an awareness of the problem, coupled with judicial 
modesty and clarity, as well as a new market for investments should help 
reduce these costs for all investors. 
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